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Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg and Antitrust Law’s Rule[s] of Reason
by
Jonathan B. Baker and Andrew I. Gavil1
INTRODUCTION
For more than a century, the interpretation and application of the Sherman Act has been
guided by the “rule of reason.” Its history is well known. The U.S. Supreme Court famously
declared in its 1911 Standard Oil decision that Section 1 of the Sherman Act was to be guided by
“the standard of reason which had been applied at common law.”2 Seven years later, the Supreme
Court elaborated on the content of the rule of reason in Chicago Board of Trade, directing courts
to evaluate a competitive restraint’s nature, purpose, and effect, and providing a laundry list of
factors that might be considered in doing so. 3
For the next sixty years, the Court largely turned away from further exploration of the kind
of comprehensive rule of reason analysis it envisioned in Chicago Board of Trade, focusing instead
on what became known as the “per se rule.” By 1978, this would lead the Court to describe the
“rule of reason” and the “per se rule” as if they were two distinct “rules.”4 In truth, however, they
were but two ways of applying the same standard, the “standard of reason” that the Court had
endorsed in Standard Oil and that, as elaborated in Chicago Board of Trade, called for something
akin to a totality of the circumstances assessment of a restraint’s nature, purpose, and effects.
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But by the late 1970s, with changes in the make-up of the Court and the political climate,
new life was breathed into the content of the rule of reason in cases like Sylvania5 and Broadcast
Music, Inc.,6 igniting a generational wave of reform that continues to this day. These reforms efforts to operationalize the rule of reason and adapt it to the decisional needs of various kinds of
cases - have spawned something of a “meta” rule of reason7 that now guides antitrust decisionmaking under both the Sherman and Clayton Acts, applying in analogous fashion to challenges of
concerted conduct under Section 1, unilateral exclusionary conduct under Section 2, and mergers
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.8
Judge Ginsburg played an instrumental role in this period of reform for antitrust law. It
coincided with his ascendance to positions of authority at the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice, where he served first as Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Regulatory
Affairs (1983-84) and then as Assistant Attorney General (1985-86), and later when he was
appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which he joined in 1986.9 When he
was a Deputy Assistant Attorney General at the Antitrust Division he was a signatory to the
government’s influential amicus brief in the Supreme Court in the NCAA case,10 which is often
cited as the source of the modern “quick look” approach to the rule of reason. And as a judge of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit he participated in the en

Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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8
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9
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banc decision in United States v. Microsoft Corp.,11 a monopolization case that elaborated a
reasonableness approach to evaluating conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and authored
the court’s opinion in Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC,12 further contributing to the development
of structured and abbreviated application of the rule of reason in cases involving collaborative
conduct by rival firms. Viewed together, these two decisions advanced the cause of a structured,
pan-antitrust rule of reason, drawing attention to the similarities of approach between Sections 1
and 2 and bringing the “rule of reason” full circle to its origins in Standard Oil, where the Supreme
Court had recognized that it lies at the heart of both Section 1 and Section 2.
Finally, the Chapter will explore his influence on the analysis of mergers. It highlights the
role played by the Justice Department’s legislative proposal for revising Clayton Act §7, presented
to Congress when Ginsburg served as Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, in moving the courts away
from employing a strict, near- per se rule approach to merger review. It also explores the parallels between
the D.C. Circuit’s influential approach to horizontal merger analysis, adopted in 1990 and reaffirmed in
2001, and the reasonableness analysis employed by the same circuit in Sherman Act agreement and
monopolization decisions.

I.

Origins and Development of the Rule of Reason “Continuum”

The late 1970s ushered in a period of unprecedented and rapid evolution of antitrust law in
the United States, facilitated by accumulating criticisms of the doctrine that had developed in the
preceding decades, changes in the make-up of the Supreme Court, and a significant shift in the
political climate which brought new and reform-minded leadership to the federal antitrust
enforcement agencies. The Court’s move away from extensive reliance on per se prohibitions for
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a wide range of conduct and its return to the “rule of reason” as the presumptive, default standard
for analysis of conduct challenged under Section 1 of the Sherman Act 13 invited renewed interest
in judicial methods for structuring what seemed to be the open-ended and unguided approach of
Chicago Board of Trade.14
One of the more influential commentaries of the time was Phillip Areeda’s The “Rule of
Reason” in Antitrust Analysis: General Issues, a short monograph prepared for the Federal Judicial
Center as a “study aid” for federal judges.15 Areeda questioned the Supreme Court’s “impulse to
categorize”16 as displayed in National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE), which described
Section 1 analysis as falling into two complementary, but seemingly distinct categories - “per se”
and “rule of reason.”17 In his view, the “dichotomy between the per se and rule of reason categories
is far less sharp than first appears.”18 He observed that “so-called per se rules are nothing more
mysterious or special than presumptions of varying strength and breadth” and that similarly “the
so-called rule of reason also contains within itself numerous presumptions of varying strength and
breadth.” He concluded that “we might clarify our thinking and enhance the understanding of bar
and business by dropping per se and rule of reason terminology altogether.”19

Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58-59 (“we do make clear that departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based
upon demonstrable economic effect rather than … upon formalistic line-drawing.”).
14
For a more complete account of the evolution of the rule of reason, see Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond
Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (2012).
15
PHILLIP AREEDA, THE “RULE OF REASON” IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: GENERAL ISSUES (Federal Judicial Center
1981).
16
Id. at 42.
17
Nat’l Soc’y Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 692.
18
AREEDA, supra note 15, at 25.
19
Id. at 36. See also Timothy J. Muris, The New Rule of Reason, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 859 (1989). Muris observes
that since the mid-1970s the Supreme Court “has consistently applied one rule of reason” and that “[p]er se rules do
not represent a separate form of analysis, but instead result from applying the one rule.” Id. Frank Easterbrook, who
argued the NCAA case for the government, wrote an influential article recommending use of presumptions (or
filters) to structure the rule of reason inquiry that was published in the same year NCAA was decided. Frank H.
Easterbrook, Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984).
13
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The Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission heard this invitation and took
up the cause in NCAA.
A.

NCAA

In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma,20 the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia contended that certain
features of the NCAA’s contracts with broadcasters for the rights to televise NCAA-sanctioned
college football games unreasonably restrained trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The district court and the court of appeals both agreed that the television contracts violated Section
1, but whereas the district court had conducted a lengthy trial that took into account the NCAA’s
proffered defenses, the court of appeals affirmed invoking the “per se rule,” in part. As presented
to the Court, therefore, the standard for judging conduct under Section 1 was the seemingly binary
choice offered by NSPE: per se or rule of reason, as if each represented a distinct standard and
carried with it a highly differentiated burden of proof. The contrast was between “facial”
condemnation and “full-blown” rule of reason analysis, which, the NCAA argued, demanded proof
of a relevant market, market power, and competitive harm.
The Justice Department had taken an early interest in the case, filing an amicus brief in
support of the plaintiff universities in the Tenth Circuit. It again supported them before the
Supreme Court, this time joined by the Federal Trade Commission, but with something of a twist.21
Although the parties before the Court did not advocate any less characterization-dependent
approach, the brief filed by the United States did, arguing that even though the court of appeals
may have erred in condemning the NCAA’s conduct as per se unlawful, the characterization line

20

468 U.S. 85 (1984).
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd.
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21

-5-

between “per se” and “rule of reason” was far less defined than the Court’s previous decisions had
suggested.
The government’s brief, which Judge Ginsburg signed in his capacity as a Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, directed the Court’s attention to Areeda’s monograph, prompting the Court to
quote one of his most memorable observations: “[t]he essential point is that the rule of reason can
sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an eye.”22 In a lengthy footnote, the Court also embraced
the views expressed by the government more broadly, specifically as it related to the role of market
power in the analysis of competitive effects. The Court quoted the government’s brief at length,
stating that the Solicitor General “correctly observes”:
There was no need for the respondents [plaintiffs below] to establish monopoly
power in any precisely defined market for television programming in order to prove
the restraint unreasonable. Both lower courts found not only that NCAA has power
over the market for intercollegiate sports, but also that in the market for television
programming—no matter how broadly or narrowly the market is defined—the
NCAA television restrictions have reduced output, subverted viewer choice, and
distorted pricing. Consequently, unless the controls have some countervailing
procompetitive justification, they should be deemed unlawful regardless of whether
petitioner has substantial market power over advertising dollars. While the
‘reasonableness’ of a particular alleged restraint often depends on the market power
of the parties involved, because a judgment about market power is the means by
which the effects of the conduct on the market place can be assessed, market power
is only one test of ‘reasonableness.’ And where the anticompetitive effects of
conduct can be ascertained through means short of extensive market analysis, and
where no countervailing competitive virtues are evident, a lengthy analysis of
market power is not necessary.23
The Supreme Court agreed, holding that “[a]s a matter of law, the absence of proof of market
power does not justify a naked restriction on price or output. To the contrary, when there is an

22

NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 n.39 (quoting AREEDA, supra note 15, at 38). For further insights into the development of
the Justice Department’s position in NCAA, see Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade Commission and the Rule of
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agreement not to compete in terms of price or output, ‘no elaborate industry analysis is required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement.’”24 The case came to be
associated with the labels “quick look” or “abbreviated” rule of reason analysis, a seemingly
middle-ground between per se condemnation and “full” rule of reason treatment.
The implications of the decision, however, were more far-reaching. In large part due to
the government’s brief, the Court had turned away from a simple, binary conception of the rule of
reason, opening the door to a more flexible approach – one not inconsistent with National Society
of Professional Engineers, notwithstanding that decision’s description of a bifurcated analysis,
because it was informed by the decision’s overarching direction that the relevant analysis must
focus on an assessment of competitive effects.25 As was implicit in the government’s brief, the
Court also took an important step towards acknowledging that the “per se rule” was actually an
application of the rule of reason, and that applying the rule of reason should not proceed
haphazardly, but in a step-by-step approach that starts with anticompetitive effect and then moves
on to consider procompetitive justifications.
B.

Polygram26

In one of his most substantial antitrust opinions, Judge Ginsburg built on the earlier work
to which he had contributed at the Justice Department in NCAA with the benefit of almost two
additional decades of developments. By the time Polygram came before the D.C. Circuit, the

Id. at 109 (quoting Nat’l Soc’y Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 692). See also FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) (noting that “proof of actual detrimental effects” can “obviate the need for an inquiry into
market power”).
25
NSPE, 435 U.S. at 690 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added):
The test prescribed in Standard Oil is whether the challenged contracts or acts “were unreasonably
restrictive of competitive conditions.” Unreasonableness under that test could be based either (1) on
the nature or character of the contracts, or (2) on surrounding circumstances giving rise to the
inference or presumption that they were intended to restrain trade and enhance prices. Under either
branch of the test, the inquiry is confined to a consideration of impact on competitive conditions.
26
Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
24
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Supreme Court also had decided California Dental Association v. FTC,27 in which it had further
elaborated on the role of abbreviated or “quick look” rule of reason analysis and its relationship to
per se condemnation, holding that “[t]he truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive
effect are less fixed than terms like ‘per se,’ ‘quick look,’ and ‘rule of reason’ tend to make them
appear…. What is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for the case, looking to
the circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint.”28 The D.C. Circuit had also decided Microsoft,
discussed below, which refined the approach to evaluating the reasonableness of conduct under
Sherman Act §2.29
In Polygram, the FTC challenged an agreement between two joint venture partners,
Polygram and Warner Communications, to suspend the promotion of two previously and
independently released recordings of the “Three Tenors” during the introductory period of a third
album, which they had co-produced.

The FTC had concluded that the agreement was

anticompetitive, but the defendants sought review of that decision in the D.C. Circuit.
The D.C. Circuit’s unanimous decision, authored by Judge Ginsburg, provided the court
with an opportunity to review the history and development of the rule of reason, with particular
attention to the use of non-per se, yet still “abbreviated,” rule of reason analysis. As the court
explained, that analysis “has gone through a transition over the last twenty-five years, from a

27

526 U.S. 756 (1999).
Id. at 780-81. In dissent, Justice Breyer proposed a structured approach to the rule of reason inquiry. Id. at 782
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
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In another important antitrust opinion by Judge Ginsburg, the D.C. Circuit had also decided Superior Court Trial
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structured, burden-shifting analysis later adopted by the D.C. Circuit in Polygram. See, e.g., Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass’n, 856 F.2d at 249 (“Nor did the Commission look for market power when it analyzed the SCTLA
boycott under the Rule of Reason; under that approach it was not necessary for it to proceed any further once it
determined that there were no countervailing procompetitive justifications for the facially anticompetitive boycott.”)
28
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dichotomous categorical approach to a more nuanced and case-specific inquiry.”30 Citing to
California Dental, the court concluded its review of that history by noting that “[i]t would be
somewhat misleading … to say … the Court has moved from a dichotomy to a trichotomy, when
in fact it has backed away from any reliance upon fixed categories and toward a continuum.”31
What remained to be sorted out was how a court can apply this rule of reason “continuum” in a
specific case.
For that, the FTC had “revived the analytic framework” it had earlier developed in its 1998
decision in Mass. Board - a post-NCAA effort to structure the rule of reason inquiry through
distinct, burden-shifting steps that were oriented towards the litigation process, and which allowed
for abbreviated condemnation of conduct having relatively obvious anticompetitive effects and no
procompetitive justifications. As explained by the court, the FTC’s approach proceeded in several
steps:
First, the Commission must determine whether it is obvious from the nature of the
challenged conduct that it will likely harm consumers. If so, then the restraint is
deemed “inherently suspect” and, unless the defendant comes forward with some
plausible (and legally cognizable) competitive justification for the restraint,
summarily condemned. “Such justifications,” the Commission explained, “may
consist of plausible reasons why practices that are competitively suspect as a
general matter may not be expected to have adverse consequences in the context of
the particular market in question, or they may consist of reasons why the practices
are likely to have beneficial effects for consumers.”…
If the defendant does offer such an explanation, then the Commission “must address
the justification” in one of two ways. First, the Commission may explain why it can
confidently conclude, without adducing evidence, that the restraint very likely
harmed consumers…. Alternatively, the Commission may provide the tribunal
with sufficient evidence to show that anticompetitive effects are in fact likely…. If
the Commission succeeds in either way, then the evidentiary burden shifts to the
defendant to show the restraint in fact does not harm consumers or has

30
31

416 F.3d at 33-34.
Id. at 35.
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“procompetitive virtues” that outweigh its burden upon consumers.32
The defendants objected to the FTC’s framework on the ground that it conflicted with the
Supreme Court’s previous decisions, especially California Dental. Specifically, they argued that
it improperly allowed a restraint that is not per se illegal to be condemned “without the
Commission having to prove the restraint actually harms competition.”33 In defendants’ view,
California Dental had limited use of abbreviated rule of reason analysis to cases involving proof
of “actual” competitive harm.34
Although the D.C. Circuit did not endorse the Commission’s analytical framework in all
of its particulars, it rejected the defendants’ cramped interpretation of California Dental as
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s “continuum” concept.35 Instead, the court concluded that,
at least as applied by the FTC in Polygram, the Mass. Board framework was an acceptable way
“to ascertain whether the challenged restraint hinders competition” and so satisfied the

Id. at 35-36. Although the FTC associated its framework with Massachusetts Board, decided in 1988, Areeda’s
1981 monograph for the Federal Judicial Center had also proposed a structured rule of reason inquiry as “three
pronged”:
32

…. (1) What harm to competition results or may result from the collaborators' activities? (2) What
is the object they are trying to achieve and is it a legitimate and significant one? That is, what are
the nature and magnitude of the "redeeming virtues" of the challenged collaboration? (3) Are
there other and better ways by which the collaborators can achieve their legitimate objectives with
fewer harms to competition? That is, are there "less restrictive alternatives" to the challenged
restraint?
As difficult as they are, those inquiries are much easier than the final judgment which
depends upon some kind of weighing and balancing of pluses and minuses.
AREEDA, supra note 15, at 2. Foreshadowing the concept of abbreviated rule of reason analysis, Areeda went on to
observe that “[f]ortunately, a satisfying resolution is possible in a good number of cases where one of the three
elements is significant and the others are not.” Id.
33
416 F.3d at 36.
34
For a further examination of California Dental’s implications for quick look analysis, specifically the relative
importance of evidence of “actual” as opposed to relatively obvious “theoretical” harm, see Gavil, supra note 14, at
757-59.
35
416 F.3d at 36 (“we reject PolyGram’s attempt to locate the appropriate analysis, and the concomitant burden of
proof, by reference to the vestigial line separating per se analysis from the rule of reason.”).
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requirements of the Sherman Act.36 Reviewing the record assembled by the FTC, it thereafter had
no difficulty in affirming its conclusion with respect to the challenged agreement to suspend
promotional efforts.
Polygram thus made two important contributions to the evolution of the contemporary rule
of reason. First, it provided a comprehensive and coherent explanation of the evolution of the
Supreme Court’s rule of reason jurisprudence from a dichotomous approach to the more flexible
rule of reason continuum of California Dental. In doing so, it explained how “per se” and “rule
of reason” are best understood as two ways to apply the same standard - the standard of reason and not as two distinct ”rules.” It also advanced the cause of structured rule of reason analysis as
an alternative to the mythologized “full-blown” and unguided rule of reason that was a
manifestation of the dichotomous approach.37 That approach has now been more fully endorsed
by the Supreme Court.38
II.

The Reintegration of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act: Microsoft

As noted at the outset of this chapter, the Supreme Court’s 1911 decision in Standard Oil
still stands as the acknowledged origin of the “rule of reason.” But the rule of reason is most often
associated solely with Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In United States v. Microsoft Corp.,39 the
D.C. Circuit reestablished the close tie between Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act in two
important ways. First, as in Polygram, which followed it by four years, the court spelled out a
step-by-step, burden-shifting framework for evaluating allegedly exclusionary conduct by single

36

Id. at 36-37.
For a more complete analysis of the current state of the rule of reason, see ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E.
KOVACIC, JONATHAN B. BAKER & JOSHUA D. WRIGHT, ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 246-58 (3d ed. 2017).
38
Ohio v. American Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018) (noting the parties’ agreement that “[t]o determine
whether a restraint violates the rule of reason … a three-step, burden-shifting framework applies”).
39
253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
37
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firms. In addition, it revived the long-dormant notion that Section 2, like Section 1, ought to be
guided by a “rule of reason.”
As Judge Ginsburg would later do in Polygram, the en banc court in Microsoft commenced
its discussion of the relevant legal standard for judging exclusionary conduct by reviewing the
Supreme Court’s previous decisions interpreting Section 2 of the Sherman Act, concluding that
“[f]rom a century of case law on monopolization under § 2” a four step framework had
developed.40 Much like the structured, burden-shifting approach later articulated in Polygram,
Section 2’s framework as interpreted in Microsoft begins with “anticompetitive effect … That is,
[the challenged conduct] … must harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers….
[And] the plaintiff, on whom the burden of proof of course rests, … must demonstrate that the
monopolist’s conduct indeed has the requisite anticompetitive effect.”41 If the plaintiff can do so,
“then the monopolist may proffer a ‘procompetitive justification’ for its conduct … a nonpretextual
claim that its conduct is indeed a form of competition on the merits because it involves, for
example, greater efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal—then the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to rebut that claim.”42

The court continued: “if the monopolist's procompetitive

justification stands unrebutted, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm
of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive benefit.”43 It concluded by connecting this approach

40

Id. at 58.
Id. at 58-59.
42
Id. at 59.
43
Id. The framework articulated in Microsoft has been followed by other courts of appeals, as well. See, e.g.,
Suture Express, Inc. v. Owens & Minor Distrib., Inc., 851 F.3d 1029, 1038 (10th Cir. 2017); New York, ex rel.
Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 652 (2d Cir. 2015); McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 833 (11th
Cir. 2015). It is structurally similar to the burden-shifting framework that had been endorsed by the Supreme Court
for employment discrimination claims in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
41
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to Section 1’s rule of reason: “[i]n cases arising under § 1 of the Sherman Act, the courts routinely
apply a similar balancing approach under the rubric of the ‘rule of reason.’”44
Although the court’s mere mention of the “rule of reason” in connection with Section 2
prompted criticism from commentators concerned about the purportedly “unstructured” nature of
Section 1’s rule of reason, the D.C. Circuit stood on sound historical ground. As it noted,45
Standard Oil, itself, had linked Sections 1 and 2 together, asserting that the concept of
reasonableness was at the core of both provisions of the Sherman Act:
… having by the 1st section [of the Sherman Act] forbidden all means of
monopolizing trade, that is, unduly restraining it by means of every contract,
combination, etc., the 2d section seeks, if possible, to make the prohibitions of the
act all the more complete and perfect by embracing all attempts to reach the end
prohibited by the 1st section, that is, restraints of trade, by any attempt to
monopolize, or monopolization thereof, even although the acts by which such
results are attempted to be brought about or are brought about be not embraced
within the general enumeration of the 1st section. And, of course, when the 2d
section is thus harmonized with and made, as it was intended to be, the
complement of the 1st, it becomes obvious that the criteria to be resorted to in any
given case for the purpose of ascertaining whether violations of the section have
been committed is the rule of reason guided by the established law and by the
plain duty to enforce the prohibitions of the act, and thus the public policy which
its restrictions were obviously enacted to subserve.46
Viewed together, therefore, Microsoft and Polygram paved the way to a more operational
rule of reason that was better equipped for use in the context of litigation and more focused on the
centrality of competitive effects.
III. Structural Analysis of Horizontal Mergers

44

253 F.3d at 59. See also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602-03; 605-09
(1985) (defining “exclusionary” and implicitly embracing a burden shifting approach that takes into account
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects).
45
253 F.3d at 59 (“The source of the rule of reason is Standard Oil…in which the Supreme Court used the term to
describe the proper inquiry under both sections of the Act.”).
46
Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 61-62 (emphasis added).
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The D.C. Circuit, on which Judge Ginsburg serves, took the lead in developing the modern
approach to the review of horizontal mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which combines
burden-shifting with application of a sliding scale.47 The circuit court did so in parallel with its
efforts to structure rule of reason review under the Sherman Act. The Clayton Act and Sherman
Act decisions evolved analogously, and, most likely, influenced each other.
Before the first of the key D.C. Circuit decisions was handed down in 1990, horizontal
merger analysis was governed primarily by Supreme Court precedents from the 1960s and early
1970s. In those cases, the Court employed an approach analogous to the bifurcated rule of reason
it applied contemporaneously to resolve horizontal agreements reviewed under Sherman Act §1.
In Philadelphia National Bank (PNB),48 decided in 1963, the Court established that horizontal
mergers would be presumed to harm competition when the merged firm would control an “undue”
share of the market and the merger would result in a “significant” increase in market concentration.
As applied by the courts, the structural presumption established in PNB operated much like
a per se rule against horizontal mergers. First, the presumption was easily triggered: it kicked in
at very low levels of market concentration. In two cases decided three years later, Von’s Grocery49
and Pabst,50 the Court applied the presumption to block mergers when the merged firm had, by
today’s standards, small shares in unconcentrated markets.

In addition, although the PNB

presumption was formally rebuttable through evidence “clearly showing” that a merger was not

47

Judge Ginsburg did not sit on the panels that wrote the influential merger opinions. He pushed toward less
structured merger review while serving as Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, and, in recent writing, endorsed
the way the D.C. Circuit relaxed the evidentiary burden on defendants in one of its key merger decisions. See
Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Philadelphia National Bank: Bad Economics, Bad Law, Good Riddance,
80 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 392-93 (2015). He did the latter without commenting on the court’s burden-shifting
approach and sliding scale analysis, except insofar as his hostility to the PNB presumption suggested that he would
prefer that plaintiffs not be permitted to rely on market concentration alone to establish a prima facie case.
48
United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
49
United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
50
United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
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likely to lessen competition substantially, the 1960’s Supreme Court consistently expressed
hostility towards any reliance on merger efficiencies to do so.51 In practice, therefore, as Justice
Stewart observed in his Von’s Grocery dissent, it seemed that “the Government always wins.”52
In the wake of these cases, the Justice Department promulgated merger guidelines expressing its
intention to challenge all but the smallest mergers when the four leading firms accounted for at
least three-fourths of market sales, outside of unusual circumstances.53
General Dynamics,54 the last major Supreme Court decision governing mergers,55 handed
down in 1974, showed that the merging firms could actually prevail. But the successful rebuttal
was on narrow grounds: the government did not successfully establish the factual predicate for
applying the structural presumption because it relied on market shares measured in units that did
not reflect the merged firm’s future competitive significance.56 Only later, as discussed below, did
the lower courts recognize that General Dynamics could be read more broadly to permit a wideranging rebuttal based on an analysis of whether market shares provided a basis for an accurate
prediction of the merger’s competitive effects.

51

PNB, 374 U.S. at 370-71; FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967). See also Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
52
Von’s Grocery, 384 U.S. at 301(Stewart, J, dissenting).
53
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines (1968), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH) ¶ 13,101.
54
United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
55
See also United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120 (1975) (“the Government plainly made out a
prima facie case of a violation of [§] 7 under several decisions of this Court. It was thus incumbent upon C & S to
show that the market-share statistics gave an inaccurate account of the acquisitions' probable effects on
competition”). General Dynamics is generally regarded as the last major Supreme Court decision interpreting
Clayton Act §7, although the Supreme Court issued substantive decisions in three bank merger cases, including
Citizens & Southern, shortly after General Dynamics was handed down. The enactment of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act in 1976, which created a system of pre-merger notification, contributed to the absence
of Supreme Court merger decisions by drastically reducing post-consummation challenges, which are more likely
than pre-consummation challenges to be litigated and appealed. In addition, 1974 amendments to the antitrust
expediting act eliminated direct appeals by the Justice Department to the Supreme Court. Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act—Expediting Act, Pub. L. 93-528, § 4, 88 Stat. 1708 (1974).
56
See Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1385-86 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (describing General
Dynamics as a case with “highly unusual facts” that “carve[d] only [a] limited exception[] to the broad holdings of
some of the merger decisions of the 1960s.”).
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During the Reagan administration, the Justice Department questioned the near-per se
approach established in the 1960s. Perhaps taking its cue from non-merger decisions like GTE
Sylvania57 and BMI,58 which narrowed the application of per se prohibitions under Sherman Act
§1, the Department advocated for a wider reasonableness review of horizontal mergers. When it
revised the merger guidelines in 1982, the Justice Department indicated that unless market shares
and concentration were low, it would examine “a variety of other factors,” including entry
conditions and factors related to the ease and profitability of collusion, in determining whether to
challenge a proposed acquisition.59
The guidelines’ shift toward an unstructured reasonableness review was dramatic but not
quite complete. The “other factors” were described as most relevant when market concentration
and its increase from merger were in a middle range, above safe harbor levels and below levels
where a challenge was termed likely. In addition, the guidelines suggested how litigation burdens
should be allocated by terming efficiencies a “defense” and requiring that the merging firms
establish them “by clear and convincing evidence.”60
As Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, in 1986, Douglas Ginsburg asked Congress to
revise Clayton Act §7 to codify a much less structured merger review.61

The Merger

Modernization Act he advocated would have directed courts to consider six economic factors –
market shares, ease of entry, the ability of small rivals to expand, the nature of the product and

57

Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
59
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines (1982), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep (CCH) ¶ 13,102.
60
Although the guidelines are formally a statement of government enforcement policy, they are often viewed as
persuasive authority by courts interpreting the merger statute.
61
The proposed legislation also sought to remove the incipiency language in Section 7 and to focus merger analysis
on market power rather than social and political goals. These aspects of the Clayton Act had supported the hostility
to mergers reflected in 1960s Supreme Court merger decisions. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Reagan
Administration's Legislative Initiative in Antitrust, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 851 (1986).
58
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terms of sale, past conduct of market participants, and efficiencies – as well as any other evidence
indicating whether the acquisition would substantially increase the likelihood of a greater exercise
of market power.62 Ginsburg described the proposed merger legislation as an effort to simply
codify the Justice Department’s enforcement policy under the revised merger guidelines,63 though
it seemed somewhat less skeptical about efficiencies than the then-current guidelines.64
Major appellate merger precedents handed down during the early to mid-1980s followed
the Justice Department’s lead by adopting what amounted to a comprehensive reasonableness
review of mergers. In United States v. Waste Management, Inc., the Second Circuit framed that
review with General Dynamics in mind as an inquiry as to whether market shares accurately
predict future market power.65

The appeals court held that a defendant could rebut the

government’s prima facie case based on market concentration – the basis for the structural
presumption in PNB – by showing that entry is easy. Two years later, in an opinion for the Seventh
Circuit in Hospital Corp. of America upholding an FTC decision finding two acquisitions in
violation of the Clayton Act, Judge Posner undertook a wide-ranging analysis of the competitive
consequences of the transactions.66 Posner emphasized that it was prudent for the FTC “to inquire
into the probability of harm to consumers” rather than to rely solely on “the very strict merger
decisions of the 1960s.”

62

Id.
Interview with Douglas H. Ginsburg, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 255, 270-71 (1986).
64
The 1984 revisions to the merger guidelines, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines (1984), reprinted in 4 Trade
Reg. Rep (CCH) ¶ 13,103, described the Department’s approach to efficiencies in more detail than the 1982
guidelines, but both required the merging firms to establish efficiencies “by clear and convincing evidence.” The
proposed merger statute contemplated that the merging firms would be required to demonstrate efficiencies, but not
by clear and convincing evidence. See Andrew G. Berg, Cost Efficiencies in the Section 7 Calculus: A Review of the
Doctrine, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 218, 230 (1986).
65
United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984).
66
Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.).
63
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By the end of the 1980s, accordingly, horizontal merger law was shifting away from the
near-per se illegality approach of the 1960s Supreme Court, and toward a wide-ranging
reasonableness analysis of the economic effects of the transaction. The alternatives were presented
implicitly as a bifurcated choice reminiscent of the way the rule of reason was described in NSPE:
between the near-per se approach employed by the Supreme Court in the wake of PNB and a
largely unstructured analysis of the merger’s economic effects suggested by the merger guidelines
and the mid-1980s appellate decisions.
Following the analytical structure laid out in PNB, the alternatives were described in
burden-shifting terms. But in the 1980s, burden-shifting was a vehicle for determining whether to
classify the case in a category where it would likely be found to violate the statute, or in a category
in which an unstructured economic review would be undertaken. The contested terrain in that
period was largely concerned with the concentration level above which the near-per se approach
would apply.67
Against this background, the D.C. Circuit made two critical analytical moves toward
adopting a hybrid analysis – one located between the traditional poles – in its 1990 Baker Hughes
decision,68 though that implication was not fully evident until 2001, when the same court decided
Heinz.69 Judge Ginsburg was on the circuit court at the time but did not serve on either panel. 70
The analytical innovations were to make the burden-shifting structure more explicit and to

67

Cf. William E. Kovacic, Assessing the Quality of Competition Policy: The Case of Horizontal Merger
Enforcement, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 129, 143 (2009) (describing a reduction in the threshold number of
significant rivals above which the enforcement agencies would begin to scrutinize mergers strictly, based in part on
changing judicial interpretations of merger law, “in the following manner: 1960s (12 to 11), 1970s (9 to 8), 1980s (6
to 5), 1990s (4 to 3), 2000s (4 to 3)”).
68
United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
69
FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Heinz extended the Baker Hughes framework from the
merits stage of merger litigation to preliminary injunction review.
70
We do not know the extent to which either panel drew informally on Judge Ginsburg’s antitrust expertise.
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emphasize the use of a sliding scale to determine the magnitude of the defendant’s rebuttal burden.
Neither decision referred to key Sherman Act decisions like BMI and NCAA that opened the door
to structured analyses under that statute, but they had a similar effect in authorizing a structured
reasonableness analysis akin to that which was developing in the contemporary cases under
Section 1.
Baker Hughes cast a long shadow because the federal enforcement agencies are the
plaintiffs in almost all merger challenges, and those agencies typically prefer to file suit in the
District of Columbia. It was also influential because it was written by Clarence Thomas and joined
by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, both of whom were elevated from the D.C. Circuit to the Supreme Court
within the next three years.
The Baker Hughes decision brought to the foreground the burden-shifting structure of the
analytical approach set forth in PNB. The decision described the factual predicate for invoking
the structural presumption – a showing that the proposed merger will lead to undue concentration
– as establishing a prima facie case. When a plaintiff does so, the burden of production shifts to
the merging firms to produce rebuttal evidence sufficient to undermine the prediction of
anticompetitive effects suggested by PNB. If the merging firms successfully satisfy their burden,
the government bears the burden of undermining that evidence and/or producing additional
evidence of anticompetitive effect and retains the ultimate burden of persuasion. In addition, the
decision announced that evidence would be weighed on a sliding scale: “The more compelling the
prima facie case, the more evidence the defendant must present to rebut it successfully.” The
sliding scale recognized that evidence satisfying the plaintiff’s initial burden can vary in strength,
and it calibrated the merging parties’ burden to reflect that strength.
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In applying its interpretation of PNB to the facts before it, though, the Baker Hughes panel
used language that encouraged an unstructured reasonableness analysis. It characterized the
Supreme Court’s decisions as having “adopted a totality-of-the–circumstances approach to the
statute, weighing a variety of factors ….” The decision went on to explain that “Evidence of
market concentration simply provides a convenient starting point for a broader inquiry into future
competitiveness.…”71 On the facts, moreover, the court concluded that the district court properly
found that “the prima facie case inaccurately depicted the probable anticompetitive effect” of the
merger. It credited evidence that market shares were volatile and shifting, that sophisticated buyers
would promote competition, and that entry barriers were low. In practice, therefore, the court’s
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis operated similarly to the unstructured review characteristic
of mid-1980s appellate decisions.
The possibility for a structured review that would fall between the per se and
comprehensive reasonableness approaches, created by the combination of burden-shifting and a
sliding scale, became evident eleven years later, when a different D.C. Circuit panel decided
Heinz.72 In applying the framework for merger analysis set forth in Baker Hughes, the Heinz panel
indicated that courts should, in practice as well as in theory, give more weight to a strong prima
facie case based on concentration.

The court also indicated that it would be “anomalous” to impose a heavy burden of production on a defendant
when it is easy to establish a prima facie case “simply by presenting market concentration statistics.” Baker Hughes,
908 F.2d at 992. In a recent article Douglas Ginsburg argued, consistent with a possible implication of this
language, that courts should not rely on high post-merger concentration as a basis for presuming that horizontal
mergers are illegal. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Philadelphia National Bank: Bad Economics, Bad
Law, Good Riddance, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 384-86 (2015).
72
One of the authors of this article, Jonathan Baker, testified for Heinz in the district court as an economic expert.
He describes the economic evidence presented in litigation in Jonathan B. Baker, Efficiencies and High
Concentration: Heinz Proposes to Acquire Beech-Nut (2001), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 157 (John E. Kwoka,
Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 5th ed. 2008).
71
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The district court had declined to enjoin the merger. It found that coordination was unlikely
after the merger of the two smaller firms in a three-firm market, for two main reasons: the
remaining two firms would have difficulty deterring cheating, and the substantial efficiencies that
the merger would generate would give the merged firm a greater ability and incentive to compete
more aggressively with the industry leader than either merging firm had before.
The circuit court reversed and remanded for entry of a preliminary injunction. It observed
that the lower court had found that the market was highly concentrated: the merger would have
created a duopoly. The district court also found that the merger would result in the loss of
substantial direct competition, and that barriers to market entry were high. These facts added up
to a strong prima facie case.
To rebut that case, the appellate panel held, the district court would have needed to specify
reasons unique to the industry to support the conclusion that post-merger coordination would be
especially difficult, sufficient to overcome the ordinary presumption of coordination in a merger
to duopoly. In its view, the rebuttal facts in the record were insufficient to overcome this elevated
bar, so, the panel concluded, the government plaintiff should prevail.73
As the Heinz decision implicitly recognized, the combination of burden-shifting and a
sliding scale can structure merger analysis to permit a type of structured inquiry. As with the
analogous rules developed for evaluating reasonableness under the Sherman Act, this has the
practical consequence of creating a hybrid form of analysis between a bright line per se rule and a

73

Post-merger concentration levels in Baker Hughes were nearly as high as in Heinz. But when Baker Hughes was
decided, proof of ease of entry, the main defense in that case, was well-established as a route for rebutting the
government’s prima facie case. By contrast, proof that competition would not be harmed because of the beneficial
effects of merger-related efficiencies, the main defense in Heinz, was less well established when that case was
decided (and remains so today). This difference provides an alternative explanation for the differing outcomes of
the two cases.
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comprehensive and unstructured reasonableness review. On the facts credited by the circuit court
in Heinz, the government met its initial burden of demonstrating probable anticompetitive effects
owing to a very high degree of post-merger concentration, but the defendants failed to satisfy their
burden of production to rebut it. The court decided the case for the government based importantly
on the heavy probative weight it gave to the evidence of market concentration introduced by the
government to satisfy its prima facie case.
Lower court decisions reviewing horizontal mergers since, even outside the D.C. Circuit,
routinely apply the burden-shifting framework articulated in Baker Hughes and Heinz.74 In some
cases, courts have used the combination of burden-shifting and the sliding scale to condemn
proposed mergers on an abbreviated review, without undertaking a comprehensive balancing of
the evidence of predicted pro and anticompetitive effects. That happens when the government
wins because the defendant does not successfully rebut the prima facie case,75 and when the court
relies on the observation that the merging firms’ rebuttal burden is heightened by very high
concentration.76 On the other hand, the merging parties have benefitted from the sliding scale, and
prevailed on a review that falls short of comprehensive reasonableness analysis, when the court
determines that the government’s prima facie case, while satisfied, is relatively weak.77 The
merging firms have also prevailed when the court concluded that the government failed to establish

The DC Circuit’s influence has been both direct and indirect. Looking to appellate decisions from outside the
D.C. Circuit, Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. FTC, 534 F.3d 410, 423-24 (5th Cir 2008), relied heavily on Baker
Hughes. In Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 778 F.3d 775, 783 (9th Cir 2015), the Ninth
Circuit looked primarily to Chicago Bridge in setting forth its analytical framework. In FTC v. Penn State Hershey
Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 337 (3d Cir. 2016), the Third Circuit relied mainly on Saint Alphonsus.
75
See, e.g., ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559, 572 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Bazaarvoice,
Inc., 2014 WL 203966, at *70 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir 1993); United
States v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064, 1087 (D. Del. 1991); United States v. Energy Solutions, Inc., 265 F.
Supp.3d 415 (D. Del 2017); United States v. Tribune Pub. Co., 2016 WL 2989488, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
76
United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Bazaarvoice, 2014 WL 203966, at *70; FTC
v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp.2d 1069, 1082 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
77
FTC v. Foster, 2007 WL 1793441, at *56 (D. N.M, 2007); FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp.2d 109, 129-30
(D.D.C. 2004).
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a prima facie case.78 The burden-shifting structure does not invariably mandate the result: even
if the merging firms successfully rebut the government’s prima facie case, the government may
still satisfy its burden of persuasion by bringing additional evidence to bear beyond the
concentration statistics it relied on to meet its initial burden of production.79

Under such

circumstances, a strong prima facie case may count in the government’s favor,80 or the government
may simply prevail on what amounts to totality of the circumstances reasonableness review.81
As this brief survey suggests, courts now routinely seek to structure horizontal merger
reviews using the analytical framework established by the D.C. Circuit in Baker Hughes and Heinz
and influenced more broadly by developments under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. That
approach may shape horizontal merger analysis going forward in two ways. First, the courts may
adopt the views of commentators who call for strengthening the sliding scale by heightening the
practical burden of production on merging firms when the plaintiff has made a strong prima facie
case.82 Second, the courts can be expected to allow the government to meet its prima facie case,
and shift the burden with evidence other than concentration: particularly evidence that one
merging firm’s products are the second choice for a substantial fraction of the customers of its
merger partner’s products, which suggests unilateral competitive effects, or that one of the merging
firms is a maverick constraining coordination from becoming more likely or more effective, which
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United States v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc., 172 F. Supp.2d 172 (D.D.C. 2001); United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F.
Supp.2d 1098, 1155, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2004); FTC v. Lab. Corp., 2011 WL 3100372, at *21 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
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FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp.2d 34, 63 (D.D.C.1998); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 190 F. Supp.3d 100
(D.D.C. 2016).
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FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 75 (D.D.C. 2009); FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp.3d 1, 72
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suggests coordinated effects.83 These possibilities would probably not have been evident to
Douglas Ginsburg in 1986, to then-judges Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader Ginsburg in 1990, or
to the D.C. Circuit panel that decided Heinz in 2001, but they are reasonable forecasts about the
way Baker Hughes and Heinz will evolve in the current environment.84
CONCLUSION
Today’s rule of reason is moored by the analysis of competitive effects, and the structured
framework for assessing those effects can be observed across all areas of antitrust law. In this
chapter, we have sketched the formative period in which this framework emerged and evolved,
often not as a means of filtering “weak” cases, although it served that function, too, but instead as
a way to assist courts in identifying and more readily condemning unreasonably anticompetitive
conduct, be it collusion between rivals, exclusionary conduct by a single firm, or mergers. In
multiple ways across his impressive career, Judge Ginsburg played an important role in promoting
these kinds of improvements to the administrability of the antitrust laws, and to our understanding
of the common role of structured analysis across all of these types of conduct.
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See generally BAKER, supra note 82, at 79-80.
Truly “truncated” analysis in the sense of NCAA (i.e., “evidence of actual harm”) is more likely to occur in the
evaluation of consummated mergers than in the evaluation of proposed acquisitions.
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